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Recent research by Falcon, Hayami, Mellor, Ruttan, Schultz, Timmer, and 
others have made it clear that agricultural development is important and that 
new technologies, price incentives, and supporting infrastructure are its 
primary determinants. This work has convinced most policy makers that farmers 
respond to production incentives. 
Given this, it is surprising how few traditional views about rural 
financial markets {RFMs) have changed. While farmers are acknowledged to be 
rational in reacting to product and input prices, they are thought to be 
unresponsive to changes in deposit incentives, and to need low--even negative--
real interest rates on loans. Also, while it is widely acknowledged that food 
price controls benefit consumers and damage producers, it is not generally 
recognized that low interest rates unfairly benefit borrowers at the expense of 
depositors. Likewise, it is widely recognized that low farm prices and lack of 
public investment in agriculture lessen incentives for those who create new 
farm technologies, but little is said about how repression of rural financial 
markets affects discovery of cost-reducing financial technologies. 
Traditional views permeate policies, practices, and projects in RFM in 
moat countries outside of East Asia. In the following discussion we argue that 
many of these views are incorrect, that RFMs are asked to do tasks for which 
they are ill suited, and that this misuse of RFMs substantially increases the 
transactions costs therein and distorts and discourages the discovery of new 
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financial technology that would made RFMs operate more extensively, 
efficiently, and equitably. 
We also argue that transactions costs are excellent measures of how well 
RFMs are working and that policy makers ought to be as concerned about 
encouraging cost-reducing innovations in service industries such as RFMs as 
they are in stimulating new agricultural technologies. Further, we argue that 
RFMs will only provide reliably services to a large number of rural people if 
these costs are reduced through innovations. RFM innovations, in turn, are 
largely determined by the extent of the market. Financial repression forces 
financial markets to contract, which, in turn, reduces the extent of formal 
financial intermediation and lessens the impetus for cost-reducing innovations. 
Role of RFMs 
Before discussing innovations and transactions costs in more detail it is 
useful to review the contributions of RFMs to development. 
Numerous governments attempt to use RFMs as fiscal agents to dispense 
subsidies, via concessionary or soft loans, to particular groups (Von Pischke). 
Cheap credit for small farmers, land reform participants, or for those affected 
by various natural disasters are examples of this. Credit programs that pay 
little attentions to loan collection also transfer subsidies. In addition, 
most countries attempt to step up the pace of agricultural development by 
targeting concessionary loans for selected investments, products, inputs, or 
regions. 
Recent research is showing that using RFMs for these two purposes achieve 
much less than policy makers hoped and also cause damaging side effects. 
Because the subsidy associated with a loan is always proportional to the size 
of the amount borrowed, the benefits from cheap credit are largely captured by 
3 
those who have the most access to loans--the well-to-do. At the same time, all 
savers who wish to hold deposits, especially the poor, are penalized by the low 
interest rates forced on deposits because of the cheap loans. The well-to-do 
can often avoid these low returns on deposits by holding their assets in other 
foras. As a result, RFMs distribute subsidies regressively. Differentially 
low interest rates on loans for the poor exacerbate this process by further 
discouraging interaediaries from making concessionary loans to clients who are 
the aost costly to service per unit of money lent. 
Research is also showing that targeted loans have less effect on borrower 
behavior than anticipated. In many cases loans are targeted by policy aakers 
because other incentives are weak for the preferred activity. But, because 
borrowed funds are fungible (interchangable), they are used for the purpose 
deemed most desirable by the borrower, regardless of the policy maker's 
priorities. The investment priorities of the borrower and policy aaker will 
only coincide when the borrower expects the targeted activity to be the most 
rewarding of all alternatives available. At the same tiae, if, because of 
relatively high yields and prices, the targeted activity ranks high on most 
farmers' marginal investment list, targeted loans are not necessary to convince 
them to allocate additional funds to this activity. Likewise, when the returns 
on the targeted activity are relatively low the targeted loans will have no 
effect on the relative profitability of the targeted activity or on the 
marginal investaent decisions aade by the borrower. 
While not widely recognized, rural financial intermediation is expensive: 
participants are geographically scattered, financial transactions are saall, 
rural incomes tend to he unstable, clearly defined collateral is often not 
available, rural people are usually less well educated than urban people, and 
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it is costly to collect information about rural borrowers. These substantial 
costs naturally impede financial markets from making contact with rural people, 
especially the poor. As will be discussed in more detail later, loan targeting 
and use of RFMs as fiscal agents substantially increase these costs and force 
RFMs to contract, rather than to expand, their services. This contraction 
results in RFMs doing less intermediation between surplus and deficit units. 
This, in turn, results in resources being less efficiently allocated in rural 
areas, a role that only an integrated and extensive RFM can perform. It is 
this important role that is usually ignored by governments trying to target 
loans or to transfer subsidies through loans. The unfortunate side effect of 
many of these policies is an increase in the transactions costs of RFM 
participants, which, in turn, further constricts the coverage of the formal 
financial system--especially for non-preferred clients. This is the exact 
opposite of what policy makers intended. 
Types of Transactions Costs 
There are four categories of transactions costs: the costs incurred by 
borrowers in getting loans, the costs of savers making deposits, the 
intermediary's costs of making loans, and the intermediary's costs of accepting 
and aalntaining deposits. These costs are above and beyond the interest 
payments made by borrowers and changes in the purchasing power of loans due to 
inflation. 
Borrower transactions costs include expenses of visiting the lender 
several times to negotiate a loan, paying bribes, covering the costs for 
paperwork, and incurring the opportunity cost of time spent negotiating the 
loan. While generally smaller, some of the same types of costs are encountered 
by depositors, especially those living long distances from the intermediary. 
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Lenders incur both fixed and variable transactions costs. Buildings, 
personnel, and vehicles cause aost of the fixed expenses. Collecting 
information about the borrower, securing collateral, maintaining loan accounts, 
providing inforaation to governments and donors about targeted lending, and 
loan collection contribute to variable costs. On the deposit side, the 
interaediary must again cover a portion of its fixed costs, maintain accounts 
for accepting deposits and allowing withdrawals, and handling the liquidity 
management probleas involved in balancing deposits and loans. 
Allocation of Transactions Costs 
One might expect total transactions cost in RFMs to be allocated in fixed 
proportions aaong participants. Recent research, however, has shown that the 
allocation of these costs among the four categories of participants, aaong 
individuals within each category, and the total amount of these costs are 
dependent on financial market policies (Ladman). Further, research is showing 
that inter•ediaries transfer, absorb, or in some cases increase transactions 
cost incurred by various classes of individuals as a rationing device, 
depending on whether they are preferred or non-preferred clients (Cuevas and 
Graham). 
Lenders often allocate transactions costs to ration financial services 
when financial aarkets are repressed by interest rate restrictions. Because of 
the inability to use interest rates to ration intermediary services under 
financial repression, intermediaries reallocate transactions costs and adjust 
collateral requirements to increase the effective costs for non-preferred 
clients, while, at the same time, reducing the effective costs for preferred 
clients. This leads to a false sense of control aaong policy makers who 
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manipulate interest rates, but who cannot control the allocation of 
transactions cost, and thus cannot control the effective costs of borrowing. 
Several exaaples of how reallocations of transactions costs are used to 
encourage or discourage the demand for an interaediary's services, soaetiaes 
inadvertently, may clarify this important point. In the aid-1980s the 
Development Finance Corporation (DFC) in Belize only had one employee in its 
Punta Gorda office. Because of concessionary interest rates, there were 
always requests for DFC loans in excess of the funds available, particularly at 
planting time. As a result, it was common for small farmers who lived 20-30 
miles away from the DFC office to pay for a truck ride to town (leaving at 5 
a.m.), then stand in line for 4-5 hours in front of the DFC office, only to 
have it close for the day at 11 a.a., before the farmer had even gotten a loan 
application (MUCIA). 
Small farmers repeated this process an average of 6-7 times before they 
got a loan application, filled thea out, had the loan approved by the local 
officer, returned to see if the head office in the capital city had approved 
the loan, gotten loan disburseaent, and repayed the loan. At the saae tiae, 
large farmers who lived in town were able to meet the DFC official at the 
borrower's convenience and negotiate an extension of their borrowing 
arrangements in a matter of minutes. While both the small and the large 
borrowers paid the same rates of interest on their loans, the effective-
borrowing-cost rate for the small farmer, when borrower's transactions costs 
were included, were 3-4 times that of the large borrower. Because of the high 
transactions costs imposed on small borrowers, aany of them found it cheaper to 
borrower from informal lenders who charged up to 4 percent per month for loans. 
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By way of contrast, the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh sends its employees 
into villages to both make and recover loans, thus reducing borrowers' 
transactions costs while elevating the costs of the bank (Sadeque). The use of 
"barefoot bankers" in Sri Lanka and building small branches of commercial banks 
in villages in Bangladesh have had the same effect of transferring transactions 
costs from borrowers and depositors to the intermediary. 
On the deposit side, commercial banks in Kenya have required depositors to 
keep a large minimum balance as a way of discouraging small depositors. Some 
financial intermediaries in Africa have gone so far as to tax small savings 
accounts as a way of eliminating them, while granting special privileges to 
large depositors. In sharp contrast, mobile banks in some areas of the 
Philippines visit remote villages on a regular basis to accept deposits, thus 
decreasing depositors' transactions costs while increasing those of the 
intermediary. It is common for post offices in parts of Africa to require 
depositors to request withdrawals a week or so in advance, while a cooperative 
bank in Peru opens its deposit window during the evening and on weekends to 
make it more convenient for its depositors who are in town to shop or to attend 
church. 
Policies and Transactions Costs 
It is useful to divide RFM transactions costs into two categories: normal 
costs resulting from the operations of RFMs, and additional costs imposed on 
these markets by government actions. Normal transactions costs tend to be high 
for RFM participants because of the nature of the transactions handled; the 
relatively high interest rates charged in informal RFMs are reflections of 
these costs. Imposed transactions costs are often also high because RFMs are 
heavily regulated and repressed by governments. Because normal and imposed 
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transactions costs have different parentage, their reduction or elimination 
require separate strategies. 
Normal transactions costs, per unit of service handled, decline as RFMs 
expand and realize economies of both scale and scope. Policies that affect the 
creditworthiness and savings capacities of RPM clients, along with restrictions 
on the range of services that RPMs can provide condition how quickly these 
economies are realized. These policies also affect the returns that 
intermediaries expect from innovations aimed at reducing normal transactions 
costs, and thus the pace at which these innovations are created. If incomes 
and the rates of return on agricultural investment are low and unstable, the 
development of new RPM technology will be retarded. 
Various financial market policies, such as loan targeting, impose 
additional costs on RPMs and distort financial innovations. Extensive loan 
targeting is usually done through multiple rediscount lines in central banks, 
each with different terms, target group or activity. Even in small countries 
such as the Dominican Republic and El Salvador this may result in agricultural 
banks trying to manage two or three dozen discount lines. In extreme case, 
such as Indonesia during the late 1970s, these concessionary and targeted 
discount lines may run into the hundreds. Typically, the reporting 
requirements attached to these targeted loans substantially increase all 
participants' costs of effecting financial intermediation. Ebbs and flows in 
the funding of these lines further increase the average costs of 
intermediation, as intermediaries must increase their staff to handle peak 
flows of funds and then find they are overstaffed between surges of external 
money. 
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Typically, loan targeting is accompanied by increased reporting 
requirements to the provider of the targeted funds. A targeted agricultural 
credit program in Tunisia, for exaaple, required farmers to fill out seven 
copies of exhaustive loan applications. Copies of these applications were sent 
to five other decision-making bodies before loans were approved or rejected. 
In Bolivia, various targeted loan prograas for faraers required thea to 
fill out multiple copies of loan application forms that ran to 15 pages in 
length, saall print. Copies were then sent to regional offices and also the 
main office of the Central Bank for final approval. The better part of one 
large floor of the Central Bank building was stacked to the ceiling with these 
loan application forms. Numerous Central Bank eaployees shuffled through these 
foras, atteapted to keep thea in soae order, and were kept busy filling out 
monthly, quarterly, semi-annual, and annual reports on more than two dozen 
targeted lines of credit funded by government and various donors. The 
government and donor offices that administered the targeted loans spent time in 
filing these reports as they caae in froa the Central Bank, but it is unlikely 
if anyone read these reports or made decisions based on the inforaation 
contained therein. Reducing these types of iaposed transactions costs will 
require changes in financial market policies. 
Under these conditions, instead of atteapting to lower the normal costs of 
financial intermediation, financial innovators find it more rewarding to mine 
loopholes in, or to do end runs on, RPM regulations. These evasive innovations 
benefit the interaediary, but often result in the total transactions costs in 
RPMs increasing and coverage of these markets to shrink. An example of this is 
the government setting loan-size limits on an agricultural bank in attempts to 
force it to make aore cheap credits available to farmers with small units. 
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Interaediaries may not feel it is in their interest to coaply with the 
intention of the policy maker and evade the intent by innovating and aaking 
multiple small loans to preferred borrowers. This raises the lender's as well 
as borrowers' transactions costs 
Likewise, jnteraediaries who lend or aobilize funds aostly for donors and 
central banks often end up providing only a single financial service to 
clients. A development bank aay only extend medium- and long-term loans; a 
cooperative may only provide short-term production loans: and, postal savings 
units aay only accept deposits. While there is need for specialization in 
RFMs, large measures of this should not occur until these markets are fairly 
well extended. In most cases this extreme specialization is forced on 
financial aarkets by governaent or donor policy. One of the aain losses froa 
this is that interaediaries are unable to realize scope economies: the 
lessening of average costs that coaes froa providing more than one service. 
These losses are especially important where the making of loans and the 
accepting of deposits are divorced institutionally. For example, an 
interaediary collects valuable information about potential borrowers by 
observing their savings behavior as seen through deposit activities (Vogel). 
Financial Innovations 
Financial markets typically attract innovative people, but there has been 
little systeaatic research done on the technology they generate (Barras). 
While the process of financial intermediation is simple--mobilizing deposits 
froa surplus units and allocating loans to creditworthy deficit units--the 
options and teras for carrying out this intermediation are essentially infinite 
in number; there is extensive substitutability aaong financial instruments and 
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large numbers of relatively small transactions in RFM that are susceptible to 
being done more efficiently. 
Unlike the rice breeder, who must build new varieties from existing 
strains, a creator of new financial products or processes can invent with pen 
and paper. Likewise, given the proper environment, financial innovation can 
emerge in many parts of the system, not mainly from publicly-funded research 
centers (Bhatt). Furthermore, once a new financial technology is discovered, 
its diffusion is often rapid because of the low initial costs of adoption. 
Financial innovations are discovered mainly by managers, not researchers. 
These innovations are a natural outcome of attempts by managers to minimize 
their transactions costs. The institutions, in turn, are social innovation 
aimed at reducing the overall costs of effecting financial intermediation 
(Williamson). For many inventions, the "stimulus is a technical problem or 
opportunity conceived by the inventor largely in economic terms, that is in 
terms of costs and revenues" (Schmookler, p. 66). 
A few examples may be useful to illustrate financial innovations. All RFM 
intermediaries encounter relatively large transactions costs when they attempt 
to make small loans to borrowers who are poor, who are new clients, and who do 
not have secure collateral for their loans. In attempts to reduce the 
transactions costs of making these loans, lenders in places as diverse as 
Nepal, Thailand, Bangladesh, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, Bolivia, 
and Ghana have experimented with group loans (Adams and Ladaan). In Pakistan, 
lenders provide borrowers with pass books that are an easily-handled record of 
land title as well as borrowing and repaying performance. These books reduce 
both the lender's and borrower's transactions costs of negotiating loans. 
Forced savings programs in credit unions, in the Graaeen Bank in Bangladesh, in 
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a Malawi credit prograa sponsored by the World Bank, and in group lending 
activities in Nepal are all aiaed at reducing interaediaries' transactions 
costs of securing loan collateral. 
Often informal financial interaediaries create cost-reducing innovations 
at a faster pace than formal interaediaries. Market higglers in Jaaaica, for 
exaaple, developed a systea whereby they postponed paying faraers for their 
products until after the higgler received payaent for the goods in the city. 
This resulted in the higgler being financed by the faraer without any foraal 
loan docuaents. The pledging of cocoa trees as collateral for inforaal loans 
in Nigeria, transfer of land usufruct rights to lenders by borrowers of 
inforaal loans in Coloabia, and the rich variety of rotating savings and credit 
associations (ROSCAS) around the world are exaaples of creative finance 
(Bouaan). 
Innovations and ROSCAS 
ROSCAS merit special attention because they are so coamon in LDCs, have 
such a wide range of adaptations, and are surprisingly dynaaic (Nayar). They 
also illustrate how innovative people can be who are involved in financial 
interaediation, given appropriate conditions. In its siaplest fora, a ROSCA is 
foraed by a saall group of individuals who agree to contribute a given aaount 
of aoney or coamodity periodically to a pot. The distribution of the pot is 
done in rotation to aeabers of the group. For example, a 10-aeaber group that 
made contributions of $10 each to a aonthly pot, would result in each aeaber 
getting $90 froa other aeabers at the time they received the pot, and the 
ROSCA'S cycle being coapleted in ten aonths. Those who get the pot early are 
borrowing froa those who coae later in the rotation and are net savers. 
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As an aside it is surprising how often ROSCAS are found among employees of 
foraal financial intermediaries. Many of the employees of the National Credit 
Union Federation in Chocabamba, Bolivia, for example, are members of ROSCAS. 
Many of the employees of commercial banks and the Central Bank in Belize and 
Bolivia are also aembers of ROSCAS. There is at least one ROSCA operating 
aaong eaployees of the International Monetary Fund in Washington DC, all of 
whom have Ph.D. degrees! 
The tremendous diversity in ROSCAS is the result of numerous individually 
crafted innovations that have molded this institution to the contours of vastly 
different societies. Analyses of these innovations shed light on why ROSCAS 
are so popular and also clarify the role innovations play in financial 
intermediation. For discussion purposes it is useful to group some of these 
innovations into three categories: those that substitute for collateral, those 
that determine how the rotation is carried out, and those that affect 
transactions costs. 
Collateral is often a major sticking point in effecting financial 
intermediation between surplus (saving) and deficit (borrowing) units. ROSCAS 
handle this through several types of innovations. This includes only allowing 
those to be members who are connected by blood, clan ties, or close working 
relationships. Velez-Ibanez calls this tie "confianza" in Spanish or mutual 
trust in English. Under these circumstances, aeabers of ROSCAS who borrow and 
do not fully repay their loans are ostracized by the group. Another collateral 
innovation is for an organizer of the ROSCA to pay for any defaults by 
individuals he or she invites to participate. In even more extreme cases, 
large ROSCAS aay use aob-like tactics to enforce contract. This occurred in 
Thailand a few years ago when a member of a large ROSCA withdrew his pot and 
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then escaped to the US, only to find that a "contract" had been let for his 
life. 
There are numerous innovations in the way the ROSCA pots are distributed. 
The simplest technique is to allocate the pot by the order in which the aeabers 
joined the ROSCA, or to do it by drawing lots when the ROSCA is formed. A more 
coaplicated variation is for the organizer to get the first pot and then to 
allocated subsequent pots by lot. In small groups the allocation may be done 
on the basis of who needs it most. A sore sophisticated allocation technique 
is to have members who have not received a pot to bid each time for the 
distribution. The individual who bids the largest discount on what other 
bidding members must pay to him wins the pot (Nayar). 
There are numerous ways ROSCA organizers innovate to reduce the total 
transactions costs for their members. This includes arranging the distribution 
to coincide with members' pay days or harvesting periods, having the meaber who 
is most centrally located collect the shares, and having a professional ROSCA 
organizer handle all of the details for a number of ROSCAs. 
Research on Financial Innovations 
Recent research in agricultural production technologies has increased the 
pace of discovery of these technologies, over what occurs in nature, or over 
what can be discovered by individual farmers. A rice researcher, for example, 
is often the creator of a new technology that reduces the average costs of 
producing rice. By way of contrast, those who do research on financial 
technologies usually only report what managers of RFMs have created by way of 
innovations. RFM researchers are more observers of, rather than participants 
in, the innovation process. The focus of research on RFM innovations is aore 
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to show their effectiveness, to publicize innovations that are aost or least 
successful, and to shown how soae policies affect the innovation process. 
To date, aost of the analysis of transactions costs in RFMs has been 
descriptive (e.g. Nyanin, Cuevas and Grahaa, Ladaan, Ahaed Huaeida, IDB, and 
Zia Ahaed). It has concentrated aainly on measuring the aagnitude of these 
costs, their distribution aaong RFM participants, and how various policies 
affect the use of transactions costs as rationing aechanisas. This includes 
aeasuring the trade offs between interest rates and transactions costs as 
rationing aechanisas, and showing how transactions costs vary aaong foraal and 
inforaal sources of loans. 
Several types of uses have been made of this descriptive research. First, 
interaediaries often are uncertain about the aagnitude of their transactions 
costs for handling government prograas. Research helps thea to better aanage 
their institutions and also provides thea with aaaunition to use in bargaining 
with governaent officials or donors when it coaes tiae to set the teras for 
externally funded prograas. Second, policy aakers are alaost always uninforaed 
about the real costs of projects in rural finance. Careful estimates of these 
costs help decision askers to allocated resources and to choose projects aore 
carefully. 
Third, inforaation on transactions costs provides insights into how 
efficiently and equitably RFMs are functioning, auch like a teaperature reading 
inforas a physician about the health of a patient. If RPM participants are 
incurring substantial total transactions costs, it is likely that relatively 
few people are being served by these aarkets and that the quality of services 
provided to clients will not be robust. Also, if interaediaries are inflicting 
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extensive transactions costs on non-preferred clients, one can be sure that 
interest rates are not doing an efficient job of rationing financial services. 
A decline in total transactions costs is a sign that intermediaries are 
successfully innovating, that aore people have access to financial services, 
and that the quality of financial services are increasing. The exception to 
this is a financial systea that is corrupted by politics, spends little tiae 
deteraining creditworthiness of borrowers, and even less effort in collecting 
patronage loans. Under these circuastances transactions costs for all 
participants aay be low, but loan recovery is also aodest. 
Research Priorities 
One of the advantages of doing transactions cost research is that it need 
not be based on large and costly borrower surveys. Because aany financial 
transactions are done on rules of thumb, representative case studies are often 
sufficient to clarify the nature and aagnitude of these costs aaong different 
classes of borrowers and lenders. The key issue in doing these case studies is 
to select exaaples that are typical of large nuabers of transactions. 
Research should not be limited to foraal financial arrangeaents. Because 
funds aove easily between foraal and inforaal financial interaediation, one 
should expect the rule-of--one-price to prevail between these aarkets for a 
service of the saae quantity and quality. Often wedges between what a foraal 
lender is allowed to charge a borroWE!r through explicit interest rates, and 
what the inforaal lender charges, are filled by transactions costs. Research 
on inforaal interaediation may also uncover practices, innovations, and types 
of services that might be eaulated by foraal interaediaries. 
Aside froa an expansion in descriptive studies of transactions costs in 
RPMs, there are at least five other related research areas that aight be 
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stressed: First, because the business of financial intermediation is largely 
one of processing and analyzing inforaation, computers must play an iaportant 
role in major cost-reducing innovations. This is particularly true if the 
intermediary extends and collects large numbers of small short-term loans and 
also accepts large numbers of small-to-medium sized deposits. The rapidly 
declining costs of computers will allow virtually every formal financial 
intermediary to computerize in the next few years. Research could help 
identify the types of information that should be processed by these systems. 
Analysis should also be done on the training and maintenance needs that 
accompany computerization, and identify the hardware and software requirements 
for various types of intermediaries in RFMs. 
Second, because the innovation process is so diffused it is not clear as 
to the conditions and incentives that retard or facilitate the development of 
new financial technologies. Research along this line might address questions 
such as: Which innovations are costs saving for the intermediary, but cost 
increasing for the system as a whole? What conditions appear to stimulate the 
discovery and adoption of cost-reducing technologies? 
Third, it should be possible to more carefully document the relationship 
between policies and transactions costs and to make generalizations about these 
relationships across countries and geographic areas. 
Fourth, more research is needed on the relationship between transactions 
costs and the ability and willingness of the formal financial system to 
penetrate rural areas and to provide services to new and small borrowers and 
savers. Is there any systematic relationship between these costs and market 
penetration across countries? 
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Fifth. aore infoaation is needed on how deposit services help to increase 
or decrease transactions costs. Is it possible to build a viable RFM that has 
low transactions costs and extensive penetration in rural areas without having 
aost of the foraal financial interaediaries involved in collecting deposits? 
Conclusions 
Over the past 30 years many governaents have tried to force foraal rural 
financial aarkets to extent their services aore deeply into rural areas and to 
also service poor people. While aany RPMs have built more banks and 
cooperatives in rural areas. and sharply increased the amount of funds lent, 
only a small proportion of the poor households in low income countries have 
access to dependable formal financial services. We conclude that it will be 
difficult and costly to substantially increase this coverage through targeted 
credit prograas. Financial intermediaries resist providing more services in 
rural areas largely because of the costs involved in doing so, and aany rural 
households refrain froa using foraal financial services because of their high 
costs, low returns. or poor quality. Substantially reducing transactions 
expenses through cost-reducing technologies should be a aajor eleaent in future 
strategies aimed at getting RPMs to service aore people. 
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